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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Additional Statement of Facts,

Utah Code Ann. 7-1-318 required the Bank of Utah not only to
file call reports with the Commissioner of the Utah Department of
Financial Institutions, but also to publish a certified copy of
each report in a newspaper having general circulation in Weber
County.

(Ex. 72P)
II.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A.

The Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, infra; Canyon

Country Store v. Bracey, infra; and Berube v. Fashion Centre,
Ltd., infra, trilogy of cases infer that a broad range of
recoverable damages, including attorney fees as an item of
consequential damages, are available for breach of an
implied-in-fact contract of employment.

Since Berube stated the

true nature of the law, both retrospectively and prospectively,
this Court should imply that the Bank could have reasonably
foreseen that Heslop would incur attorney fees if the Bank
breached the parties' implied-in-fact contract.

The rationale

for an award of attorney fees in a breach of a first-party
insurance contract case is equally applicable to a wrongful
termination of employment case.
B.

Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., infra, is supported by

dubious legal precedent . Some form of the exception based on an

implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
necessary because the other two exceptions apply only in
specialized and very limited factual circumstances.

The

interpretation of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and
fair dealing urged in Heslop's principal brief represents a
reasonable compromise between employer and employee interests and
should be adopted by this Court.
C.

House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., infra, is

distinguishable from the instant case.

In Utah, the existence of

a public policy cause of action should not turn on whether a
report is made to a public or a private official, but on whether
the harm caused by an employer's wrongdoing affects only the
business itself or the public in general.

The harm caused by the

Bank's inaccurate call reports affected the general public,
therefore, Heslop's claim of a public policy violation should
have gone to the jury.
D.

A large majority of courts that recognize the public

policy exception have held that it sounds in tort.

The factors

relied upon by the few courts that recognize the public policy
exception as a contract cause of action may not apply in the
State of Utah.

Independent tort causes of action present almost

insurmountable problems of proof for an employee because the
employer usually controls all the evidence.
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A tort cause of

action for violation of public policy is the best means of
assuring responsible control of the private power to discharge an
at-will employee.
III.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Trial Court should have allowed a jury instruction
on attorney fees as an item of consequential damages.

Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989)
was a wrongful termination case based on an implied-in-fact
contract exception to the employment-at-will doctrine*. A
majority of the justices on the court held that general and
consequential damages were available if the finder of fact
determined there was a breach of the implied-in-fact contract.
The justices cited directly to Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701
P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).

Berube at 1050, 1053.

Berube did not say

that general and consequential damages are only available for
breach of an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
The Beck court envisioned "a broad range of recoverable
damages" in a breach of a first-party insurance contract case.
701 P.2d at 802.

In Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d

414, 420 (Utah 1989), the court interpreted this "broad range of
recoverable damages" to include attorney fees as an item of
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consequential damages.
Beck.

Once again, this Court cited directly to

Id.

The inference is clear that a broad range of recoverable
damages, including attorney fees as an item of consequential
damages, are available for breach of an implied-in-fact contract
of employment.

The Trial Court erred in refusing to give a jury

instruction to that effect.
Berube stated the true nature of the law, both
retrospectively and prospectively.
(Utah 1984).

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661

Theoretically, the law in Utah has always

recognized an implied-in-fact contract exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine.

This being the case, it must also

be implied that the Bank could have reasonably foreseen that
Heslop would incur attorney fees if the Bank breached the
parties1 implied-in-fact contract.
Like an insured in a bad faith insurance case, a
wrongfully-discharged employee often faces catastrophic
consequences, as a direct result of the employer's misconduct, at
a time when he is particularly vulnerable, both economically and
emotionally.
The opportunity for self-employment in
America has steadily declined. Ninety
percent of our workforce can be classified as
wage or salary earners. We have become a
nation of employees dependent upon others for
almost all of our income. Today, if a worker
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loses his job, he loses almost every resource
except social welfare relief. During the
last 50 years, the ability of employees to
make employment changes has decreased,
particularly when the job seeker is old or
has only been employed by a single employer
for many years. Termination can become a
permanent blot upon an employee's record. It
is far more difficult to obtain a job with
the stigma of having once been fired. To
most Americans, no consideration other than
life, liberty, and property has greater
importance than employment.
Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of One Hundred Years of
Employer Privilege, 21 Idaho L. Rev. 201, 204-05 (1985)
[citations omitted].
The rationale used in Beck to justify "a broad range of
recoverable damages" is equally applicable to a
wrongful-termination-of-employment case.

Due to the potential

for severe economic and emotional harm to the employee, the
employee's inability to protect his interests, and the employer's
unique ability to severely harm the employee, an award of
attorney fees is more justifiable in a wrongful termination case
than in a case involving an arm's-length transaction between
parties with relatively equal bargaining power.

-5-

B.

This Court should vacate its decision in BREHANY v.
NORDSTROM and allow a cause of action for breach of an
implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in a wrongful termination of indefinite-term employment
case.

In Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. supra at 1040, 1050, this
Court acknowledged the questionable origins of the
employment-at-will doctrine.

Also, this Court soundly criticized

Martin v. New York Life Insurance Co,, 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416
(1895).
In the leading case of Martin v. New York
Life Insurance Company, 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E.
416 (1895), the Court repudiated the common
law presumption that a general hiring was for
a term of one year and uncritically embraced
the at-will rule as framed by Wood. The
Martin opinion did not analyze any prior
authority, but did assert that several other
states had adopted the at-will rule.
Berube at 1041.
In Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991), this
Court used the at-will employment language in Murphy v. American
Home Products Corp., 59 N.Y.2d 293, 304-05, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232,
237, 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (1983) to support its decision that Utah
law does not recognize an implied-in-law covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in the employment context.

Brehany at 55-56.

In Murphy, the Court of Appeals of New York failed to follow
the nationwide judicial trend of recognizing exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine.

The Murphy court said, "Thus, in
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the case now before us, plaintiff's employment was at will, a
relationship in which the law accords the employer an unfettered
right to terminate the employment at any time,"

Brehany at 55

(quoting Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 304-05, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237, 448
N.E.2d at 91).

The Murphy court deferred to the New York state

legislature the creation of an exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine.

448 N.E.2d at 90.

The first case cited by the Murphy court to support its
slavish adherence to the employment-at-will doctrine was Martin
v. New York Life Insurance Co.

448 N.E.2d at 89.

As Berube

explained, the Martin court relied upon the writings of Horace G.
Wood to support its decision.

Thus, in a sense, Brehany is

supported by the same unsound logic that was so heavily
criticized by this Court in Berube.
This Court should create exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine that are reasonable compromises
between employer and employee interests.

Some form of the

exception based on an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is necessary because the other two exceptions apply
only in specialized and very limited factual circumstances.

The

total elimination of the exception based on an implied-in-law
covenant of good faith and fair dealing will allow employers to
continue to perpetrate unreasonable dismissals in a broad range
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of factual situations.

For example, absent facts sufficient for

the case to fall under another exception, an employer could still
terminate a long-term employee solely to prevent him from
receiving a bonus, commission, or other benefit to which he had
become, or would soon become, entitled.
All three primary categories of exceptions to the
employment-at-will rule are necessary if we are to ever have a
level playing field in the employment arena.

The exception based

on an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing need
not upset the delicate balance by requiring a just cause standard
for all employers.

The standard urged in Heslop's principal

brief, which recognizes that the absence of good cause is only
one factor in determining whether there was good faith and fair
dealing, represents a reasonable compromise between employer and
employee interests and should be adopted by this Court.

See also

Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of One Hundred Years of
Employer Privilege, 21 Idaho L. Rev. 201, 249-54 (1985) [attached
hereto as Addendum "A"].
C.

The Trial Court should have allowed the jury to decide
whether Heslop's wrongful termination violated public
policy*

House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 232 N.J. Super. 41, 556 A.2d
353 (1989), cited in Defendant's Reply Brief at page 23, is
distinguishable from the instant case. Moreover, Defendant cites
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to House for the questionable proposition that whistleblowers
must report employer misconduct directly to regulatory
authorities in order to have a cause of action for violation of
public policy.
House claimed he was terminated for his opposition to
Carter-Wallace's distribution of certain batches of allegedly
contaminated Pearl Drops Tooth Polish.

House voiced his

opposition in one internal corporate meeting and to his immediate
supervisor, however, he did not convey his views directly to the
top management of Carter-Wallace.

Id. at 356, 357. No one at

Carter-Wallace resented House's opposition to the distribution of
the tooth polish.

The court concluded that House did not have a

reasonable basis for his belief that the tooth polish should not
be distributed.

The quality control division conducted extensive

testing and concluded that the tooth polish could be distributed
without danger to the public and in compliance with the law.

Id.

at 358.
Heslop reported the accrual problem to Browning, the
President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank of
Utah, and Browning responded that he would take care of the
problem.

(Tr. 136)

He also explained to Browning that the

accrual problem should be immediately resolved.

(Tr. 142, 144)

Heslop often discussed the accrual problem with other officers
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and at least four directors of the Bank.

(Tr. 348, 842)

He had

a reasonable basis for opposing the Bank's method of resolving
the accrual problem because he knew the Bank would overstate its
income which would result in the filing of inaccurate call
reports each quarter.
proved correct.

(Tr. 337)

Heslop's position was later

(Tr. 1253-54; Ex. 67P)

Browning and Kunz were

contemptuous of Heslop for exposing the accrual problem.

(Tr.

597, 854-57)
In December 1981, Heslop began preparing personal notes
about events relating to the accrual problem.

(Ex. 39P)

Heslop's adamant opposition eventually prompted Beutler to report
the accrual problem to regulatory authorities.

(Tr. 149)

During the examination of the Bank by the Department of
Financial Institutions in August 1982, Heslop voluntarily
approached representatives of the Commissioner about the accrual
problem.

(Tr. 177-78)

Later, in September 1982, he voluntarily

met with a representative of the Utah Attorney General.

At the

meeting, Heslop made a reasonable request that his testimony and
personal notes be subpoenaed so he could protect his position
with the Bank.

(Tr. 154-56, 357, 477-78)

In October 1982, the Bank's attorneys persuaded Heslop to
turn over his personal notes to them.

(Tr. 166-69)

In

November 1982, Heslop again met with a representative of the
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Attorney General, but without his personal notes.

Heslop was

overshadowed at the meeting by the Bank's attorney, Wayne Black,
who argued for an end to the investigation•

(Tr. 170-71)

Thus, in 1982, the Bank tried to prevent Heslop from making
a full report to the authorities.

Now, however, the Bank argues

that Heslop should be denied a cause of action because he failed
to make such a report.

The Bank cannot have it both ways.

The Bank's Reply Brief does not provide any reasoning to
support its proposition that a whistleblower must report directly
to regulatory authorities in order to have a cause of action.
This oversight is understandable because there is no sound
reasoning to support the Bank's proposition.

To impose an

outside reporting requirement would encourage whistleblowers to
initially report to outside officials without giving the employer
an opportunity to correct, internally and without unnecessary
publicity, harmful conduct which may only be the result of
inadvertence or a lack of communication.

The underlying policy

goals to prevent public harm may often be just as effectively
served by communication within an organization to achieve prompt
compliance as they are by public disclosure.

The Bank's

proposition does nothing but promote form over substance.

In

Utah, the existence of a public policy cause of action should not
turn on whether a report is made to a public or a private
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official, but on whether the harm caused by an employer's
wrongdoing affects only the business itself or the public in
general.
The statutory requirement that all call reports be published
in a newspaper having general circulation in the county where the
principal office of the financial institution is located is
evidence of an intent by the legislature to protect the general
public-

U.C.A. 7-1-318,

Undoubtedly, members of the general

public relied upon the information contained in the published
call reports in making important financial decisions and
protecting their financial interests.

The harm caused by

inaccurate call reports affected the general public, therefore,
Heslop's claim of a public policy violation should have gone to
the jury.
In Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 108 111.2d 502,
92 111. Dec. 561, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985), the plaintiff alleged
that he was discharged in retaliation for his refusal to work in
the handling of radioactive materials while operations were being
conducted in violation of regulations promulgated by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff

failed to report the violations to appropriate authorities,
therefore, the controversy remained an internal matter between
the employer and employee and no public policy question was
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involved.

In holding for the plaintiff and reversing the court

of appeals, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated:
We do not agree with the appellate court that
the question whether the facts as alleged
involved public policy, or a matter of
private concern, depended upon whether a
complaint was made to the regulatory
authorities. The legislation and the
regulations declared the public policy, and
the existence of that public policy did not
depend upon whether plaintiff had
communicated a complaint to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission or whether its
investigation preceded or followed that
complaint.
485 N.E.2d at 376.

The Wheeler Court allowed the plaintiff to

proceed to trial on a public policy cause of action even though
his allegations that the employer violated Federally-mandated
safety codes were made internally only.

Id. at 377; see also

Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d
385 (1980); and McOuary v. Belaire Convalescent Home, Inc., 69
Or. App. 107, 684 P.2d 21 (1984), review den. 298 Or. 37, 688
P.2d 845 (1984).
D.

The public policy exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine should sound in tort.

The standard approach in determining whether a cause of
action sounds in tort or contract "focuses upon the duty which
has allegedly been breached and asks whether that duty arises
from a promise set forth in the contract or is one imposed by
law."

Mauk, supra at 2 09.

Although it would appear that a
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prohibition against violating public policy arises from a duty
imposed by law, some judges assert that it arises from an
implied-in-law promise, set forth in the contract, not to violate
public policy.
841.

Berube, supra, at 1051; Brockmever, infra, at

Thus, the standard approach yields no clear answer when

considering the public policy exception to the at-will employment
rule.
A large majority of courts that recognize the public policy
exception have held that it sounds in tort.

Presumably, the

intelligent justices on these numerous courts carefully weighed
the arguments on both sides of the issue before reaching their
conclusions.

In Utah, Judge Thomas Greene of the United States

District Court for the District of Utah considered the issue of
whether the public policy exception sounds in tort or contract
and held that it is an action founded upon tort.

See Peterson v.

Browning, No. 400401 (Utah undecided) [A copy of Judge Greene's
Memorandum Decision and Order in the Federal action is attached
hereto as Addendum

lf

B".]

The factors relied upon by the few courts that recognize the
public policy exception as a contract cause of action may not
apply in the State of Utah.

In Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet,

113 Wis.2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983), the court noted that the
Wisconsin legislature "has enacted a variety of statutes to
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prohibit certain types of discharges."

3 5 N.W.2d at 841. In

trying to decide whether a wrongful discharge action should be
maintained in tort or contract, the court found that "[t]he
remedies established by the majority of Wisconsin wrongful
discharge statutes are limited to reinstatement and back pay,
contractual remedy concepts." Id.

The court concluded that a

contract action is most appropriate for wrongful discharges.
Utah wrongful discharge statutes, however, do not impose the same
limitations as the Wisconsin statutes and, therefore, would not
support the argument that the Utah legislature favors a
contractual remedy in wrongful discharge cases.

(R. 202-03)

The Brockmeyer court's premise that contract damages are
most appropriate because they are primarily concerned with making
the wronged employee "whole" is certainly questionable.
Reinstatement is seldom feasible in a wrongful termination case.
Neither reinstatement nor back pay compensate for emotional
injury to an employee.

Tort damages far surpass contract damages

in addressing the primary concern of making the wronged employee
"whole."
In Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239 743 S.W.2d
380 (1988), the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted the contract
approach.

But, it based its decision on the fact that "if an

employer's conduct in breaching a contract of employment is
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sufficiently egregious or extreme, the employee can still claim
tort damages on a cause of action for outrage."
385.

743 S.W.2d at

A wrongfully-discharged employee in the State of Utah,

however, will find it very difficult to bring a tort claim for
outrage because this Court has already held that "mere discharge
from employment does not constitute outrageous or intolerable
conduct by an employer."

Sperber v. Galiaher Ash Co., 747 P.2d

1025, 1028 (Utah 1987).

An employer will always try to tie his

conduct to the discharge.
Moreover, the types of independent tort causes of action
that may apply in a wrongful termination case, such as
intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and
defamation, present almost insurmountable problems of proof for
an employee because the employer usually controls all the
evidence.
The mere fact that the employment relationship is initially
contractual does not justify a conclusion that the public policy
exception sounds in contract.

In a medical malpractice case, the

initial relationship between physician and patient is
contractual.

When the physician commits malpractice, he breaches

the parties1 contract, however, he also violates a duty imposed
by law which gives the patient a cause of action in tort. An
implied-in-law promise not to violate public policy is a rather
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extreme manipulation of contract law that is unnecessary since
the traditional tort theory approach will accomplish the same
desired result.
A public policy exception sounding in tort will allow juries
and the courts to be more sensitive to the equities in a given
case and apply a broader range of remedies.

An especially

egregious violation of public policy may justify imposing
punitive damages.

An award of punitive damages not only punishes

the wrongdoer and deters unacceptable conduct, but can also
create an incentive for private individuals to bring wrongdoers
to justice.

This financial incentive can be an important factor

in motivating a plaintiff to press a claim, particularly one for
which only a small compensatory remedy is available.

Punitive

damages can also serve a compensatory function by compensating
the plaintiff for transactional expenses such as attorney fees.
See Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At-Will
Employees, 26 William & Mary L. Rev. 449, 489-91 (1985) [attached
hereto as Addendum

lf fl

C ].

A decision by this Court to recognize a tort cause of action
for violation of public policy will not have a "chilling effect"
on employers, causing them to retain unproductive employees.
Employers who routinely obey the law will never be troubled by
the public policy exception because their actions will not
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violate public policy.

Only employers who violate the law, or

encourage others to do so, will have the added worry of tort
damages for violation of public policy.
As many of the decided cases illustrate, the
burden of the at-will employment doctrine
seems to be falling most heavily and harshly
upon professional and upper and middle level
employees. They have the least protection.
Most are at-will employees and few have job
security through union or individually
negotiated contracts. They have the most to
lose, frequently being the long-term
employees who have the greatest
responsibility and substantial investment in
and the highest expectations from their
careers. Often they are at an age when
replacement of their life and medical
insurance programs and their retirement plans
are difficult or impossible. They are the
most vulnerable to the improper demands of
employers who find it profitable to take
chances with anti-trust and consumer fraud
violations, environmental pollution,
health-related misconduct, defense
procurement fraud, and the like. The at-will
employment doctrine does not include,
contemplate or require a privilege in the
employer to subject its employees to the
risks of civil and criminal liability that
participation in such activities entails.
The public policy exception is narrow enough
in its scope and application to be no threat
to employers who operate within the mandates
of the law and clearly established public
policy as set out in the duly adopted laws.
Such employers will never be troubled by the
public policy exception because their
operations and practices will not violate
public policy.
Accordingly, where an employer has discharged
an at-will employee because that employee
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refused to violate the law or any well
established and clear mandate of public
policy as expressed in the constitution,
statutes and regulations promulgated pursuant
to statute, or because the employee reported
to his superiors or to public authorities
serious misconduct that constitutes
violations of the law and of such well
established and clearly mandated public
policy, the employee has a cause of action in
tort for damages for wrongful discharge.
Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 877-78 (Mo. App.
1985) [emphasis added].
The public policy exception rests upon the premise that the
private power to discharge an at-will employee must be held
subordinate to the public interest.

A cause of action in tort is

the best means of assuring responsible control of that private
power.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the judgment for Heslop on his
cause of action for breach of implied-in-fact contract.
Additionally, the case should be remanded to the Trial Court with
an instruction to award Heslop the amount of his attorney fees as
an item of consequential damages.
The case should also be remanded to the Trial Court for the
sole determination of whether the Bank discharged Heslop in
violation of public policy sounding in tort.

If the Bank

violated public policy, the trier of fact should be allowed to
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award Heslop any additional damages that are applicable in tort,
including punitive damages.
DATED this

day of October, 1991.

RONALD E. GRIFFIN
Attorney for Ivan J. Heslop
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ADDENDUM A

1.

Good Faith and Fair Dealing Implied in Every Contract

The first, and perhaps threshold issue which must be resolved concerns the circumstances under which the covenant will be implied A&
noted, there is authority for the proposition that every contract iontains a covenant of good faith and fair dealing.246 This contention is
not without its critics, however.246
The idea that every contract whether in the field of insurance or
employment law is subject to standards of fairness and good taiih ib
not as radical a proposition as some might suggest. The obligation ol
good faith is well recognized as a component of the Uniform Cummer
cial Code (the Code) and is part of the law of every jurisdiction which
has adopted the Code. With respect to the sales of goods, secuntv de
vices, commercial paper, banking, investment securities, and ever\
transaction covered by the Code the law requires "[e]very contract or
duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in its pertormance or enforcement." 247 Similarly, Tentative Draft No o to *h> Hi statement (Second) of Contracts would impose these obligation- on ni

244 See Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful Distnii-u*
Duty to Terminate only in Good Faith, 93 HARV L REV 1816-44 (1980;
245 See .supra note 238.
246 Gram v Liberty Mutual, 384 Mass. at 666, 429 N E.2d at 28
^47

UCC § 1 203 (1978). E.g., IDAHO CODE § 28-1-203 (1980)

Ik,
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contracting parties. 248 Further, the cases which are given credit for initiating bad faith actions in California likewise recognize the covenant
as part of every contract. 249
Even in Idaho, the Supreme Court has allowed that these covenants may be obligations of every contract. In Luzar u. Western
Surety Cu 2*° the court recently considered the concepts of good faith
and fair dealing in a case involving the conversion of pledged collateral.
While the tacts of the case more closely approximate a secured transaction dispute under the Uniform Commercial Code and are thus distinguishable from a wrongful discharge case, the court nonetheless declared in dicta that: "Good faith and fair dealing are implied
obligations of every contract." 261 Whether the court truly meant "every
contract" or had some more limited category in mind remains open to
debate, but it certainly would not be without authority in extending
the obligations to all contractual relationships.
2,

Principles of Bad Faith Torts Applicable
Contracts

to

Employment

While there may be reluctance to impose the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in every contract, the principles which are the
hallmark of bad faith in contract actions, generally, seem entirely applicable to an at-will employment contract. In California, the courts
have identified three alternative standards which must be met in order
for the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to be implied. These
are: (1) where there exists a "special relationship" between the contracting parties, (2) where there is a lack of balance in the contractual
relationship, or (3) where there is a need to protect an injured victim
from emotional harm likely to result from the peculiar facts of the
c*ae.™* ThcSc conditions usually exist in most at-will employment contracts but, undoubtedly, there are and will be situations where the contractual relationship is more balanced or where other protections are
recognized and render the "bad faith" exception unnecessary.
The disparity of power and influence between the contracting parties is the most compelling justification for an implied covenant. It has
not always been ample justification, however, for the courts. In large

248 Set out at supra note 238.
249 See bupra note 222 and accompanying text.
250 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984).
251 Id. at 696, 692 P 2d at 340.
252. See Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d 4i6
181 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1982), vacated, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr 334
(1984)
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part the judiciary's reluctance lies in the tendency of advocates to
equate an absence of good cause with the absence of good faith in the
discharge of an employee. 253 Obviously, there are certain analytic falacies in that equation and something more seems to be required.
The California appellate court decision of Cleary2** is an example
of a case that contains those additional elements necessary to persuade
a court to adopt a bad faith theory of action. Despite the court'* declaration that "there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in every contract," 255 the employee's long term service, coupled with
the employer's established practice of dealing with its employee* in a
fair manner, undoubtedly influenced the result.256
The employer's practices, particularly those which provided for
"due process" in termination proceedings was likewise found to be a
significant element for the Montana Supreme Court when it adopted
the good faith exception. Noting that an employee is entitled to *ome
protection from injustice, the Montana court stated in Gutes r Life of
Montana Insurance Co.:
The circumstances of this case are that the employee entered
into an employment contract terminable at the will of either
party at any time. The employer later promulgated a handbook
of personnel policies establishing certain procedures with regard to terminations. The employer need not have done so. but
presumably sought to secure an orderly, cooperative and loyal
work force by establishing uniform policies. The employee having faith that she would be treated fairly, then developed the
peace of mind associated with job security. If the employer has
failed to follow its own policies, the peace of mind of its via
ployees is shattered and an injustice is done.257
Also, in extending the good faith exception it is fir3t recognized m Tu/ tune, the Massachusetts courts have since indicated that in order for
there to be a viable bad faith action, there must be demonstrated both
injury to the employee and benefit to the employer.258

253. Gram, 384 Mass. at 666, 429 N.E.2d at 28.
254 111 Cai. App 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980)
255. Id. at 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (quoting Comurale v. Traders & I/CH M* K-»
Co , 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P 2d 198, 202 (1958)).
256. Id. at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
257. 196 Mont. 178, 182, 638 P.2d 1063, 1067 (1982). See Keaneally v Ors^n 1 ^
Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1930).
258. Stiles v. Traveral Laboratories, Inc., 13 Mass. App. 354, 433 N E 2d 10 i JD*
peal denied, 386 Mass. 1103, 440 N.E.2d 1176 (1982).

252

IDAHO LAW REVIEW
3.

The Exception

[Vol. 21

Does Not Swallow Up The Rule

One of the criticisms of bad faith actions in discharge cases is that
the exception, if allowed, would swallow up the rule. 260 This observation misconstrues the exception as well as the rule and requires some
response.
In Gram v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., the Massachusetts Supreme Court declined to adopt a rule equating the absence of good
cause for a discharge with the absence of good faith.260 It continued to
acknowledge the viability of the bad faith theory, however. This case is
often cited as support for rejecting the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing altogether. If good faith means good cause, it is argued, then
the doctrine of at-will employment is meaningless. If, by definition, an
at-will employee is one who serves at sufferance and can be discharged
for any cause or without cause, then how can the law logically require
proof of good cause at the time of discharge? The argument obviously
has appeal, but it does not necessarily nor completely undermine the
good faith exception to the at-will doctrine.
In the first place, the contradiction which is perceived in equating
good faith with good cause is based upon a misunderstanding of the atwill doctrine and its historic origins. The characterization of employment as at-will is in reality nothing more than an observation that no
definite term of employment has been agreed to by the contracting
parties. As was discussed earlier, the mere fact that there is no established time period for the duration of the employment relationship
does not signify the absence of a contractual relationship. Once a unilateral contract has been entered into between the employer and the
employee, that contract is renewed daily when the employee reports to
work and extends his labor in acceptance of the employer's continuing
offer of compensation. Viewed in this elementary sense, there is no
principle of logic or law which precludes the imposition of conditions
or covenants upon the employment contract Despite the existence of
such conditions or covenants, which may limit other aspects of the relationship, the employment remains at-will insofar as it has no agreed
duration.
The fundamental, analytic problem which arises in equating good
faith with good cause is found in the presumption that since the employment has no agreed term, it may be terminated for any cause or
without cause While this presumption is well recognized in the case

259 Wheeler v. Data General Corp., No 82162, Idaho 4th Jud. Dist. (Oct 9, i%4)
(unpublished opinion).
260. 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981)
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law,261 there is no reasoning which supports its continued application.
It does not logically follow that because the employment has no specified term, cause is an unnecessary condition of termination. This presumption was manufactured from the pen of Horace Wood over one
hundred years ago and found its only justification in the economic, social, and political climate existing at that time which favored employer
privilege over employee protection. Wood's doctrine has been perpetuated through blind adherence to the rule and stare decisis without any
critical assessment of its integrity until recently. In the clear light of
more contemporary analysis, there exists no justification for continued
acceptance of a legal presumption which has lost whatever frail reasoning sustained it throughout the years past.
Secondly, even if the common law is unwilling to discard the
"cause" component of Wood's doctrine, it may nonetheless embrace a
good faith exception to that doctrine without contradiction. In all likelihood the Massachusetts Supreme Court was correct in its refusal to
equate good cause and good faith in Gram. As that court ah>o correctly
ruled, this refusal does not require rejection of an exception to the atwill doctrine which imposes a covenant of good faith and lair dealing
on at-will contracts of employment.
It does not require any special insight or brilliance to conclude
that good faith and good cause are distinct concepts. To paraphrase
the Idaho decision in Allen, good cause is a substantial reason—one
which is not arbitrary, frivolous, or irrelevant, a reason which is
founded upon conduct seriously prejudicial to the interests or welfare
of the employer and its enterprise. 262 Perhaps as was explored earlier,263 special factual conditions and expressed or implied promises are
necessary to impose a good cause requirement on an otherwise at-will
employment contract.
On the other hand, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
not a standard which measures the legal sufficiency of reasons given by
an employer to justify termination, but rather involves an assessment
of the lack of balance existing in the contractual relationship. It prohibits the unreasonable, excessive, or abusive utilization of the employer's superior power and advantage in that relationship. Ab in the
Gates decision, where the employer has established and promulgated
certain procedures with regard to termination/ 64 the covenant h ^ de-

261. Thomas v. Ballou-Latimer Drug Co., 92 Idaho 337, 341, 442 P 2d ~i7. 771
(1968).
262. 105 Idaho 447, 455-56, 670 P.2d 854, 862-63 (1983).
263. See supra Sections V. C. and D.
264. 196 Mont, at 178, 638 P.2d at 1063.
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fined the standards of fairness which govern the manner of employer
conduct and has proscribed the commission of unwarranted excesses.
Similary, where the employer has benefited by its conduct which has
indicted injury upon an employee, as was the situation in the Ma.^achu-etts cases which followed Fortune ™b then a bad faith claim may
result
There is nothing inherently inconsistent in an at-will ductr.ae
whiLti allows an employer to discharge without cause and a covenant
which requires that same employer to treat all employees fairly. The
good faith exception does not necessarily conflict with the at-will doctrine except insofar as it challenges preconceived notions of absolute
employer discretion assumed, without justification, to be part-and-parcel of that doctrine. To this extent the exception is no different than
the other exceptions addressed throughout this article. Indeed, if there
is any major dilference it is in the fact that the good faith exception
strives to better equalize the legal equities between employers and employees, whereas the other exceptions only serve to alter the imbalance
in specialized and more limited factual circumstances.
Little more can be said about this exception at this point in \u
development. As it evolves, in all likelihood there will be considerable
reluctance to its universal application in every at-will employment contract. Despite this reluctance, the idea that each contract is imbued
with reciprocal responsibilities of good faith and fair dealing strikes
very close to the heart of the social issues which have fueled erosions in
the historic privileges of employers. More likely than not, courts will be
hesitant to embrace the covenant and make its general application but
where special circumstances exist, such as those noted in the oases
identified, one can expect the courts' gradual accommodation.

ADDENDUM B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRXCT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH - NORTHERN DIVISION

VERN L. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 87-NC-121G
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

BROWNING, a Utah Corporation,
and DAVID W. RICH,
Defendants.

The above matter came on regularly for hearing on
December 7, 1989 on Defendants' Motion for Certification for
Interlocutory Appeal and Stay.

David Bert Havas and Michelle E.

Heward represented plaintiff, and Sharon Sonnenreich represented
defendants.

The court heard oral arguments and reviewed

extensive briefs.

Being fully advised, the court now enters its

Memorandum Decision and Order.
The Court denies defendants' Motion for Certification
to the Tenth Circuit.
The issue before the Court is driven by Utah law.

It

is clear to this court that the Utah Supreme Court recognizes a

public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.1
Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989') ;2 Loose
v. Nature-All Corporation, 1989 Utah Lexis 146 (Utah Nov. 27,
1989).

The majority in Loose said:

n

The post Berube exceptions

to the employment at will doctrine in Utah include termination in
violation of public policy, . . ."

Howcroft v. Mountain States

Telephone & Telegraph Co., 712 F.Supp. 1514 (D. Utah April 28,
1989), cited by the defendants is not inapposite.
policy exception recognized in Berube

The public

was not at issue in

Howcroft and Judge Anderson did not rule upon or even discuss it.
This Court rules that an action for wrongful
termination based upon the public policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine is an action founded upon tort rather than
contract.

The general rule in states recognizing such an

exception characterize it as the tort of wrongful discharge.3
This exception protects an at-will employee from being
discharged for a reason or in a manner that contravenes sound
principles of established and substantial policy.
2

Although there was no majority opinion in Berube, the
Plurality opinion as well as Justice Zimmermann's concurrence
indicated willingness to recognize a public policy exception.
3

Arthur S. Leonard in his law review article, A New Cordon
Law of Employment Termination, North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 66,
631 (1988) reviews reported cases and says: In Order to prevent an
employer from acting contrary to an important public policy, some
state courts have recognized a tort of "wrongful discharge" as an
exception to the at will presumption.
. . . Courts faced with a
public policy argument have searched for an existing label to place
on the resulting legal action. They have most frequently described
2

The clearest statement which appears to indicate the direction of
Utah law on this matter is Justice Durham's plurality opinion in
Berube:

"Where an employee is discharged for a reason or in a

manner that contravenes sound principles of established and
substantial policy, the employee may typically bring a tort
action against his employer" (emphasis added).

Berube at 1042

The rulings set forth in this memorandum decision and
order will become the law of this case unless within 30 days
after the date hereof a party or the parties jointly, on motion
supported by memorandum and necessary documentation, request this
court to certify the issues to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to
Rule 41 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

If such a

motion is filed, the court will set the matter for argument.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

January

^ ^>

1990,

'JK^H

/ •^dufl-/-^.

J./THOMAS GREENE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
COPIES TO: c n s l 1/24/90MP:
David Havas, Esq.
David R. Money, Esq.

it as a tort
658-662.

of wrongful

discharge.

3

...

M

(emphasis added)

Id.

at
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J5. Justifications for the Use of Punitive Damages in Wrongful
Discharge Actions
To determine whether the use of punitive damages is justified,
one must return to the policies furthered by the creation of a cause
of action for wrongful discharge. Objectives of wrongful discharge
actions include protecting the public interest from interference
with important public policies, facilitating some individual expectations, and policing unsnvory conduct. Fundamentally, however,
the obJ*ctlv$ of these actions la to correct the imbalance of power
which results from the practical inability of unorganized employees
to bargain individually for job security. Court** probably would not
have undertaken the massive modifications of tort law and contract principles that have made the creation of these rights of action possible if they did not perceive unorganized employees as a
vulnerable group in need of the law's protection.
To a modest extent, then, courts are performing for at will employees the power-enhancing function that labor unions perform
for organized employees. Yet, courts are unwilling to prescribe a
"just cause" standard for discharge,110 probably because of concern
•bout the inefficiencies such a standard would engender. As a practical matter, courts are unable to prescribe a just cause standard
because they are ill-equipped for the avalanche of litigation that
would result from such a standard. Th^y instead have created a
cluster of theories that modify the balance of power presently existing in the relationship between employers and unorganized employees without unduly stressing judicial resources.
Just as courts have awarded punitive damages to correct imbalances of power in the context of insurance121 and product liability
cases,iM these damages also can be a useful means of deterring the
abuse of power in the employment context. Although there is no
•mpirical proof that the threat of punitive damages deters undesirable behavior,ifi one can presume that the higher the risks of mistonduct, the more likely that persons contemplating such conduct,

* » . Gram v. Liberty Mut Ins. Co., 3S4 Mass. 659, 669 70, 429 N E 2d 21, 26 (1981)
121. See supra notes 16257 and accompanying text.
123L See $upra note 7.
tJ3. See Owen, Civil Punishment, supra note 5, at 111 (calling for an empirical study of
the deterrent effect of punitive damages).
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especially corporate defendants," 4 will be deterred from engaging
in it.
If compensatory damages in a wrongful discharge case are relatively small, an employer has little to lose by committing a wrongful discharge. Likewise, in the absence of punitive damages, many
employees would gain little by instituting an action for compensation. Because of the need for deterrence, it is in the public interest
to encourage meritorious litigation instituted by private individuals. The need for the extra measure of deterrence and the incentive
for private enforcement provided by punitive damages is even
more compelling in jurisdictions that limit compensatory remedies
to reinstatement and back pay, particularly when an employer's
action contravenes some strong, independent public policy. Courts
should not expect the employee, who is in a highly vulnerable position, to protect the public interest by, for example, resisting an
employer's request to commit a crime on pain of loss of employment. Instead, the courts should assume responsibility for discouraging violations of public policy.
The absence of an administrative framework for resolving disputes in wrongful discharge cases and the corresponding need to
conserve judicial resources makes it desirable for courts to employ
a remedy designed to prevent future incidents of wrongful discharge. The prevention of wrongful discharge is especially important because at will employees in lower paying positions who have
little opportunity for advancement are less likely to resort to the
legal system for a remedy than are at will employees in middle and
upper management position*."* The imposition of a punitive remedy also can be a strong and justifiable statement of moral disapproval of a defendant's abuse of his power.
Finally, punitive damages serve a compensatory function in
wrongful discharge cases. In jurisdictions that limit compensatory
remedies to back pay and reinstatement, the assessment of punitive damages serves to compensate deserving plaintiffs for intangible but nonetheless real injuries such as mental anguish and loss of
status or professional reputation that attend discharge from en-

224. See id. at 107.
225. See Note, Protecting Employee* at Will Against Wrongful Discharge The htkkt
Policy txctption, ttti HANV L KKV IWll, 1042 46 (llNKI).
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ployment Even in jurisdictions that permit a full panoply of tort
remedies, some harmful effects of wrongful discharge, such as social stigma and loss of identification, status and marketability,1*6
could remain unremedied. Moreover, even a plaintiff awarded a
full measure of compensatory damages would not be made truly
whole because she would not be compensated for transactional expenses such as attorney's foes.
The purposes underlying the doctrine of punitive damages are
••rved by the use of punitive damages in appropriate wrongful discharge cases. They enhance the admonitory force of wrongful discharge actions, thus facilitating the objectives that militated for
lh* creation of such actions.

